The common-sense model (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980) outlines how illness representations are important for understanding adjustment to health threats. However, psychological processes giving rise to these representations are little understood. To address this, an associative-learning framework was used to model low-level process mechanics of illness representation and coping-related decision making. Method: Associative learning was modeled within a connectionist network simulation. Two types of information were paired: Illness identities (indigestion, heart attack, cancer) were paired with illness-belief profiles (cause, timeline, consequences, control/cure), and specific illness beliefs were paired with coping procedures (family doctor, emergency services, self-treatment). To emulate past experience, the network was trained with these pairings. As an analogue of a current illness event, the trained network was exposed to partial information (illness identity or select representation beliefs) and its response recorded. Results: The network (a) produced the appropriate representation profile (beliefs) for a given illness identity, (b) prioritized expected coping procedures, and (c) highlighted circumstances in which activated representation profiles could include self-generated or counterfactual beliefs. Conclusions: Encoding and activation of illness beliefs can occur spontaneously and automatically; conventional questionnaire measurement may be insensitive to these automatic representations. Furthermore, illness representations may comprise a coherent set of nonindependent beliefs (a schema) rather than a collective of independent beliefs. Incoming information may generate a "tipping point," dramatically changing the active schema as a new illness-knowledge set is invoked. Finally, automatic activation of well-learned information can lead to the erroneous interpretation of illness events, with implications for [inappropriate] coping efforts.
developed the commonsense model (CSM) to explain people's reactions to health threats, central to which is explaining the way individuals form a cognitive representation of the health threat. Leventhal et al. outlined five core dimensions of such representations; Identity (the label given to the health threat), Cause (beliefs about the origin of the health threat), Timeline (beliefs about the duration of the health threat and whether it is acute, cyclical, or chronic), Consequences (beliefs about the physical, psychological, social, and economic outcomes of the health threat), and Control/Cure (beliefs about the extent to which the health threat is amenable to treatment). The construct validity of these dimensions has been confirmed in a number of studies (e.g., Baumann, Cameron, Zimmerman, & Leventhal, 1989; Lau, Bernard, & Hartman, 1989; Meyer, Leventhal, & Gutmann, 1985) , and are typically measured by the Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ; Weinman, Petrie, Moss-Morris, & Horne, 1996) , although more recent IPQ versions assess additional dimensions (Broadbent, Petrie, Main, & Weinman, 2006; MossMorris et al., 2002) . The CSM proposes that individuals' representations of a health threat determine how they will cope with it. For example, an illness represented as an acute infection may lead a person to take medication to destroy the infection-causing bacteria, whereas its representation as a chronic condition may lead a person to make lifestyle changes, such as exercising, to increase his or her long-term well-being and survival chances. These are common-sense responses, seen as necessary and appropriate, as perceived by the individual (Leventhal, Diefenbach, & Leventhal, 1992) . Hagger and Orbell (2003) confirmed associations between illness representations and various ways of coping through metaanalysis, despite which little attention has been focused on how illness representations are generated. According to Leventhal et al. (1980) , illness representations are formed on the basis of the individuals' own experiences of illness (e.g., symptoms), information from others (e.g., family members, doctors), and general lay beliefs about their illnesses. Leventhal, Leventhal, and Breland (2011) highlighted the importance of prototypes in illness representation and their associations with coping procedures-people tend to have prototypical knowledge about various health threats, their symptoms, and what to do about them. Prototypes are stored representations of sets of psychologically differentiable but related targets or concepts (i.e., category members) developed from ex-perience (Fiske & Taylor, 2013) . A prototypical illness representation comprises knowledge-or beliefs-about the illness, acquired through experience and social learning. This information enables the individual to form a representation of an encountered health threat (Leventhal et al., 1980) . Because beliefs reflect acquired, stored, and recalled knowledge, they are memory phenomena. However, what are the processing mechanics for activating and combining beliefs into an illness representation? How do these representations trigger coping responses?
We explore these questions by placing the CSM (Leventhal et al., 1980) within an associative-memory framework. Below we examine illness representations as events in memory and the application of connectionist networks for investigating process mechanics of representation encoding and retrieval. This level of analysis may yield useful insights about why certain representations are formed, whether this process is (a) automatic, (b) whether component beliefs are independent or part of a knowledge set (or schema), (c) why representations may include inaccurate or counterfactual beliefs, (d) how illness representations trigger coping responses, and (e) how illness representations and coping may change as symptoms unfold over time. Insights, in turn, have implications for the measurement of illness representations, currently dominated by explicit measures such as the IPQ (Broadbent et al., 2006; Moss-Morris et al., 2002; Weinman et al., 1996) .
Illness Representations as Memory Events
Consistently coactivated concepts can become linked in memory through associative learning (Eiser, 1994; Smith, 1996 Smith, , 2009 Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005) . Hence, illness representations may comprise coherent sets of linked beliefs (i.e., knowledge) associated with specific health threats, symptoms, and coping procedures (i.e., a schema) (Lowe, Porter, Snooks, Button, & Evans, 2011) . For example, when people face symptoms and diagnostic uncertainty, they may use knowledge from similar experiences to make predictions about what is wrong and how the situation will unfold. Leventhal, Nerenz, and Steele (1984) illustrated this process with an example of "John," who initially misconstrues his symptoms as indigestion and tries to continue normal activities. Symptoms worsen, and John suspects it may be something more serious (e.g., stomach ulcer, liver disease). Eventually, the pain becomes severe, his general practitioner (GP) is contacted, and he is admitted to the hospital as an emergency and ultimately diagnosed with coronary disease.
An influential approach for understanding encoding and retrieval of information in associative memory is connectionism (Eiser, 1994; Smith, 1996) . This has been successfully applied to modeling social-cognitive phenomena such as attitudes, attributions, prejudice, and personality (Eiser, Fazio, Stafford, & Prescott, 2003; Eiser, Stafford, & Fazio, 2009; Shoda & Mischel, 1998; Van Overwalle, 1998; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005; Van Overwalle & Van Rooy, 1998) . Connectionism involves the use of connectionist networks for an understanding of the mechanics of information computation that underlies cognition (Callan, 1999; O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; O'Reilly, Munakata, Frank, Hazy, & Contributors, 2012) . Connectionist networks are usually implemented in the virtual environment of a computer simulation (e.g., McLeod, Plunkett, & Rolls, 1998; O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) .
We used this approach for examining the way illness representations are construed within an associative-learning framework.
In constructing the connectionist model, we assumed that two sets of information become linked in memory through experience and learning. First, people associate an illness label with beliefs about the illness. Second, specific illness beliefs are associated with particular coping procedures (Leventhal et al., 2011) . If this system was cued with an illness label, associated beliefs would be triggered, along with their allied coping representations. Indeed, McAndrew et al. (2008) describe a top-down process in which a person's knowledge that he or she has a specific illness can activate linked beliefs and coping procedures. Conversely, beliefs associated with symptoms for an initially unknown illness can activate allied beliefs, candidate illness label(s), and coping representations, comprising a bottom-up process seen in acute conditions in which symptoms signal the presence of a problem (McAndrew et al., 2008) . Thus, an athlete experiencing pain in his or her knee may attribute it to a poor maneuver (cause), believe it to be a strain (label) that is not serious (consequences) and is likely to pass quickly (timeline), and expect that it will get better through rest (coping).
We used our connectionist model to test this assumed structure for three illnesses: indigestion, heart attack, and cancer. Figure 1A shows associations of illness labels with specific beliefs. For our purposes, indigestion was associated with a fast (acute) timeline, modest consequences, high control, and a lifestyle cause; a heart attack was associated with a fast timeline (unfolds quickly), serious consequences, low control, and a lifestyle cause; cancer was associated with a slow (chronic) timeline, serious consequences, low control, and a dispositional (e.g., genetic) cause. Although these are hypothetical, research shows that, for example, lifestyle and genetics or familial factors are key attributions for heart disease (French, Senior, Weinman, & Marteau, 2001 ) and cancer (Kwate, Thompson, Valdimarsdottir, & Bovbjerg, 2005) , respectively. Figure 1B shows associations between specific illness beliefs and coping procedures. Here, seeing the GP was associated with both acute and chronic illnesses (i.e., short and long timeline) and illnesses with modest or serious consequences; use of emergency services was associated with illnesses that unfold quickly (i.e., short timeline) and which are serious; and self-treatment was associated with illnesses that have modest consequences and which are controllable (i.e., treatable).
We predicted that the connectionist network would successfully associate illness labels with a set of illness beliefs (H 1 ); the network would associate beliefs with specific coping procedures which could be activated subsequently when presented with an illness label (H 2 ); partial information about an unidentified illness would activate a wider belief set (but which may not necessarily reflect the reality of the illness situation; H 3 ); and illness representations and associated coping procedures would change over time as symptoms evolve (H 4 ).
Method

The Connectionist Network
The network was simulated using MATLAB computer software (MATLAB, 2013) , applying a form of learning called error backpropagation (following Callan, 1999) . Backpropagation was This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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deemed appropriate because it is an established, powerful, yet parsimonious approach to learning which has successfully modeled belief-based phenomena elsewhere (e.g., Eiser et al., 2009; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005) . The type of backpropagation network was a three-layer autoencoder (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) . When presented an input pattern, an autoencoder reproduces the same pattern as its output. This system can model content-addressable memory, reproducing a full pattern from a noisy or incomplete stimulus. Thus, if presented with the illness label (only) at input, a system trained with an illness-belief pairing should be able to reproduce both the illness label and the belief as its output. A typical backpropagation architecture was used (see Figure 2 ) in that the network comprised clusters of units (nodes) arranged into three layers. Each unit was fully connected to all units in the next layer up. The network comprised 14 input units, five hidden units, and 14 output units. In detail, the first layer, the input layer was where a stimulus pattern was imposed on the network. For simplicity, each unit represented a discrete psychological construct. There were 14 input units, with one unit representing each of the following: illness label (indigestion, heart attack, cancer), timeline (fast, slow), consequences (modest, serious), control/cure (low, high), cause (lifestyle, disposition), and coping (GP, emergency services, self-treat). Activation was sent, via weighted connections (the arrows in Figure 2 ), to the second layer, the hidden layer. This layer had fewer units than the input layer (here, five units) which restricted representational capacity and forced the network to extract central relationships within the data and treat less useful information as noise. Essentially, different inputs producing a very similar output were collapsed together into the same hidden-layer representation; inputs producing their own particular output were represented by a unique hidden-layer representation (McLeod et al., 1998) . This enabled the system to evolve prototypes to represent critical input-output relationships. Pilot runs indicated that this hidden-layer size (five units) was sufficient to accommodate relationships in the data used for our simulations. Hidden-layer units sent activation (again, via weighted connections) to the output layer, which was where the system produced its response. Each output unit represented a discrete psychological construct; there were 14 units, mirroring the input-layer size so that it could reproduce the input pattern.
Weighted connections are adjustable, which is how the system learns. As such, long-term information is stored on the connections, whereas activation on the units reflects what is on the system's "mind" at any given moment (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) . The pattern that the system should produce (here, a reconstruction of the input pattern) is known as the target. Learning input-target associations occurs during training, which emulates prior experience of co-occurring health threats, symptoms, beliefs, and/or behaviors. During a training event, a stimulus is imposed on the input layer, and activation automatically passes through the weighted connections to ultimately produce a pattern of activation on the output layer. Initially, the system knows nothing about stimulus-target associations and produces a random response. The network used the generalized delta rule for learning. That is, the error between the system's own output and the desired target (which here is the same as the input stimulus) is used for learning. Essentially, some (hidden and output) units are receiving too much activation and others too little. The system corrects for this by adjusting incoming connection weights according to the degree and source of the error. When the same stimulus is imposed next time, the output should shift toward the desired target. Over many training cycles, the network is increasingly able to produce the appropriate response to a given stimulus.
Once trained, the network should be able to reconstruct a complete pattern from a partial (incomplete) input. This is analogous to a person experiencing illness symptoms, and based on prior knowledge, perhaps through a previous experience or via social learning, generates a hypothesis as to the nature of the condition. Alternatively, a person may be able to recall relevant information (beliefs) given a specific illness label. This can be emulated by testing the trained network. Partial activation of a pattern on the input layer reflects, for example, an encounter with an exemplar illness (label); the system responds by activating associated information (illness beliefs, coping behavior) as output. By examining inputoutput responding, it is possible to gain insight into associativememory processing of illness representation.
The Current Simulations
Two simulations explored distinct, but associated issues. Simulation 1 examined the illness-representation profile and coping response associated with a presented illness label. This represents a situation in which a person, believing they have a specific (named) illness, recalls information about that illness and what to do about it. Simulation 2 explored what would happen if a person did not know what was wrong, and how his or her illness representation and coping may change over time as the interpretation of symptoms evolved. Here, select beliefs, presumed to be associated with interpreting specific symptoms, were cued at input, and the network's response, in terms of illness representation and coping, was examined. For both simulations, findings comprised the mean of outputs across 200 simulator runs. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Training and Testing Stimuli
A null output from a connectionist network may reflect either the nonexistence of a relationship in the data, or a failure of the processing system to detect a relationship that exists. Therefore, networks are usually exposed to data containing known associations; a null output would indicate a problem with the network. This is conventionally achieved using artificially generated data whose associations are known in advance (e.g., Eiser et al., 2003; Eiser, Stafford, & Fazio, 2009; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005) . A similar approach is found in tests of statistical procedures (e.g., Clatworthy, Hankins, Buick, Weinman, & Horne, 2007) . Table 1 shows training patterns used herein. Data consisted of two types of information. The upper table section shows how illness labels were paired with beliefs about specific illness features (i.e., illness labels to beliefs). The lower table section shows how illness beliefs were paired with various coping procedures (i.e., illness beliefs to coping). Some associations were anticipated to be stronger (i.e., better learned) than others. To reflect this, the amount of training between patterns varied; Table 1 shows the relative proportions of item pairings. The intention was that some pairings would be more established in memory and so would be influential in constructing a response.
Note that our aim was not to examine a particular finding from the literature. Rather, we examined the more abstract question of how an information-processing system might "compute" available knowledge (whatever that knowledge might be) to construe an illness representation. That is, how beliefs might be structured to solve logical problems posed by implementing a core element of the CSM within an information-processing system. For example, as highlighted above, part of the solution was to pair illness labels with beliefs, and beliefs with coping; our implementation never explicitly paired illness labels with coping. Thus, although individual belief labels were to some extent arbitrary, it was important for labels to characterize logical patterns to facilitate interpreting the network's behavior within the context of illness representation. We accept that this is a simplification and that people have a range of beliefs about a given illness. Our point is that, in as much as a person's beliefs are consistent, the network can explore how such knowledge might be internally structured and predictive.
Prototype patterns comprised strings of numbers; a feature's presence or absence was represented with a 1 or 0, respectively. During stimulus presentation for both training and testing the network (see the next two paragraphs), noise was added to the selected case to convert the prototype pattern into an exemplar. The 1 and 0 values were adjusted down or up, respectively, by a random value of up to 0.2.
Network training. Starting (untrained) network weights were initialized to a random value between 0 and 0.2. We used interleaved training; illness-labels-to-beliefs and illness-beliefs-tocoping patterns were combined into a single data set from which items were randomly selected, without replacement, rather than presented as two separate data sets. The network went through the training-data set until all patterns had been presented. Each presentation of the whole set is called an epoch; the network was trained across 300 epochs. (Pilot runs using a cross-validation process [i.e., early stopping] showed that the system achieved a maximal train-test data fit at approximately 550 epochs, but improvement after about 300 epochs was small.) To prevent unstable and suboptimal training, the network was i) constrained in how much it learned at any given moment (i.e., learning rate) and ii) a proportion of learning in one data presentation was carried over to the next presentation (i.e., momentum). Following piloting, the learning rate was set to 0.01 and momentum to 0.8, the proportion of potential learning implemented as weight change and carried over respectively. A logistic function constrained hidden-and output-unit activation to between 0 and 1, preventing unrestrained or run-away escalation. Weights were updated following each pattern presentation.
Network testing. Following training, the network was tested. Here, new or fragmented patterns were presented to see how the network interpreted them based on its prior learning. For simulation 1, testing comprised presenting illness labels-one at a time-by activating the input unit representing a given illness identity. Because the network specialized in pattern completion, it would activate outputs associated (both directly and indirectly) with a given illness label. That is, it would reconstruct a set of illness beliefs associated with that identity (i.e., the illness representation) and allied coping procedures. In simulation 2, select beliefs (but not the illness identity label) were activated at input to explore the construction of a representation for an unidentified illness unfolding over time. Here, consecutive test patterns reflected different phases of an unfolding illness of unknown iden- Indigestion  3  0  3  0  0  3  3  0  Heart attack  3  0  0  3  3  0  3  0  Cancer  0  3  0  3  3  0  0  3  Illness beliefs to coping  Consult general  practitioner  3  3  3  5 This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
tity. This aimed to determine how changing beliefs (reflecting changes in symptom interpretation) influences an overall illnessrepresentation and coping procedures. Activation on the output units was recorded for subsequent analysis. For simplicity, illness-identity features had two possible "states." For example, timeline could be either short or long, whereas consequences could be either modest or serious. We eased interpretation of the network's output by collapsing these binary categories into a single summary score for each illness belief. This was done by simply subtracting one output of the pair from the other. Thus, in Figures 3 and 5 , a positive/negative value represents relative belief in a long/short timeline, severe/modest consequences, high/low control/cure, and a lifestyle (or behavioral)/ internal (or dispositional) cause.
Results
Simulation 1
Illness-representation profiles associated with a presented illness label. This simulation examined beliefs and coping procedures activated when presented with a specific illness label. When presented each illness label (one at a time), the trained network produced an output profile as summarized in Figure 3 . Columns represent mean activations (with SD bars) across 200 simulator runs. (Exploratory runs showed the simulator produced column patterns similar to those in Figures 3 and 4 within approximately 10 runs that were maintained at 500 runs, indicating quick acquisition of a steady state.) We predicted that illnesses would differ in their representation (belief) profiles. This was tested with a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA): Illness Label (indigestion, cancer, heart attack) ϫ Representation Dimension (Timeline, Consequences, Control/Cure, Cause), with repeated measures on both factors. Results confirmed that representation profiles differed as a function of illness label; there was a significant two-way interaction between illness label and representation dimensions, F(6, 194) ϭ 834.02, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .96. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t tests compared each illness belief for indigestion with their equivalents for both cancer and heart attack, and also compared cancer beliefs with their heart attack counterparts. All comparisons differed significantly except the Consequences comparison between cancer and heart attack, t 199 ϭ 1.53, p ϭ .13: Timeline lowest, t 199 ϭ 7.42, p Ͻ .001; Consequences lowest, t 199 ϭ 44.87, p Ͻ .001; Control lowest, t 199 ϭ 8.72, p Ͻ .001; Cause lowest, t 199 ϭ 15.49, p Ͻ .001. Profiles followed the anticipated pattern: Indigestion was construed as having a short timeline, modest consequences, relatively controllable, and having a lifestyle cause. Cancer was regarded as slowly unfolding, serious, relatively uncontrollable, and having an internal/dispositional cause. A heart attack was seen as quickly unfolding, serious, relatively uncontrollable, and having a lifestyle cause. In sum, the learning system successfully associated illness labels with a specific profile of illness beliefs. Profiles described characteristic knowledge about each illness.
Coping associated with a presented illness label. During training, specific illness beliefs were paired with particular coping procedures. Figure 4 shows the mean activation (and SD bars) of each coping procedure for each illness. Data were analyzed by two-way ANOVA: Coping Procedures (attend GP, emergency services, self-treat) ϫ Illness Label (indigestion, heart attack, cancer), with repeated measures on both factors. Findings confirmed our predictions; the network prioritized seeing a GP for cancer, emergency services for a heart attack, and self-treatment for indigestion. That is, there was a significant interaction between coping procedures and illness label, F(4, 196) ϭ 475.76, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .91. Post hoc t tests (Bonferroni corrected) showed that activation of the GP coping response was significantly higher for cancer than when presented with either illness label, indigestion, t 199 ϭ 26.45, p Ͻ .001, or heart attack, t 199 ϭ 21.60, p Ͻ .001. Activation of accessing emergency services was significantly higher for heart attack than when presented with either illness label, indigestion, t 199 ϭ 11.31, p Ͻ .001, or cancer, t 199 ϭ 24.55, p Ͻ .001. Finally, activation of the self-treatment response was significantly higher for indigestion than when presented with either a heart attack, t 199 ϭ 34.46, p Ͻ .001, or cancer, t 199 ϭ 7.51, p Ͻ .001.
Simulation 1 demonstrated how an associative-memory system could learn and retrieve illness-specific beliefs and use this information to predictably prioritize a coping response. However, we also wanted to explore how a person might try to "make sense" of symptoms for an unknown illness as it unfolded over time. Simulation 2 looked at how the associative-learning system would respond when presented changing illness beliefs in the absence of an illness label.
Simulation 2
Illness-representation profiles activated for an unknown illness as it unfolds over time. When people feel unwell, but have no label for the problem, they use beliefs associated with presenting symptoms to construct a representation of the situation at that point in time. This information is used to determine how to cope, with prioritized strategies changing as the situation evolves (Leventhal et al., 1984) . We simulated an unfolding illness, looking at representations activated from incomplete illness information, and how changing representation profiles influenced coping. Three issues were of interest. First, whether the system could use incomplete illness information (symptom-related beliefs) to construe a fuller illness representation (belief profile) based on existing knowledge. Second, whether this self-reconstruction contained beliefs inconsistent with information from the presenting situation. In other words, whether activated knowledge would contain counterfactual beliefs. Finally, how the changing illness representation influenced coping as symptom interpretations evolved.
The network was trained as described for Simulation 1 above. However, testing involved presenting separate patterns, one after the other, each representing a different "phase" of an illness. Specifically, the network was sequentially presented with three incomplete-but somewhat different-illness-belief profiles reflecting an unfolding understanding of the situation over three time points. An illness label was not presented, its identity being unknown. The first belief profile was for something transient (analogous to Leventhal and colleagues' (1984) example of John believing he had indigestion), which comprised modest Consequences, low/uncertain Control, and a lifestyle/behavioral Cause. Note that attributing cause is associated with the experience of illness symptoms (Leventhal et al., 2011) . As such, a causal inference was included, despite the pattern representing an illness whose specific label was unknown. The second symptom interpretation was for something serious, and comprised beliefs about serious Consequences and low/uncertain Control. The final symptom interpretation was for something urgent, and consisted of beliefs about a short Timeline, serious Consequences, and low/ uncertain Control. The shift from something transient to something serious involved changing consequence beliefs from modest to serious and causal beliefs from lifestyle/behavior to unknown. The change from something serious to something urgent involved the addition of one belief (short Timeline) to the existing profile.
Four observations were of relevance. First, as symptoms evolve over time, the associated illness representation should also change, with knock-on effects for coping choice. Thus, we expected the activated illness-representation profiles as well as prioritized coping to differ across illness time points as the symptom interpretation evolved. Mean activation (and SD) of illness-representation profiles for the three phases of the unfolding situation are shown in Figure 5 . Columns indicate activated beliefs at output, and arrows at the top indicate the direction of beliefs cued at input. The difference (change) in belief profiles over the three time phases was assessed with a two-way ANOVA: Illness Time Phase (something transient, something serious, something urgent) ϫ Representation Profile (Timeline, Consequences, Control/Cure, Cause) with repeated measures on both factors. Representation profiles significantly differed according to phase. That is, there was a two-way interaction between illness representation and phase, F(6, 194) ϭ 2548.74, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .99. The pattern of coping across the three illness phases is shown in Figure 6 . A two-way ANOVA compared coping (GP, call emergency services, self-treat) across illness time phase (something transient, something serious, something urgent) with repeated measures on both factors. Findings showed that coping varied according to illness phase, F(4, 196) ϭ 2069.01, p Ͻ .001 p 2 ϭ .98). Post hoc t tests (Bonferroni corrected) showed that for something transient, activation of self-treatment was significantly higher than either seeing the GP (t 199 ϭ 27.76, p Ͻ .001) or calling emergency services (t 199 ϭ 21.05, p Ͻ .001). As the situation evolved into something serious, coping priority shifted to Figure 5 . Illness-representation profile generated during an unfolding illness situation. The network was presented with select illness beliefs but no illness label. Columns represent the network's activation at output with positive/negative values represent: long/short Timeline, severe/modest Consequences, high/low Control/ Cure, lifestyle (behavioral)/internal (dispositional) Cause. Arrows denote beliefs activated at input with upward/ downward arrows indicating positive/negative activation of Beliefs at input. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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seeing the GP, which was significantly higher than either calling emergency services (t 199 ϭ 15.65, p Ͻ .001) or self-treatment (t 199 ϭ 69.15, p Ͻ .001). When the illness was finally deemed urgent, calling emergency services became the priority over seeing the GP (t 199 ϭ 22.16, p Ͻ .001) and self-treatment (t 199 ϭ 99.53, p Ͻ .001). Overall, the pattern of coping changed as the illness representation evolved over time.
The second observation was activation of those illness beliefs that were not also presented as input stimuli (see the columns in Figure 5 without arrows above them: timeline for something transient and something serious, and cause for something serious and something urgent). Despite the absence of situational information (input activation), the network inferred these illness beliefs (their activation significantly differed from zero; lowest t 199 ϭ 9.86, p Ͻ .001). This shows how people may use existing knowledge to generate hypotheses or expectations about an illness, despite an absence of information.
Third, when facing an unknown illness, the system invoked profiles for (relatively) closely matching known conditions, rather than piecemeal activation of independent beliefs. Correlations comparing the patterns of belief activation (columns) shown in Figure 5 with those in Simulation 1 involving a known illness (see Figure 3 ) reveal they are similar: something transient with indigestion (r ϭ .89, p Ͻ .001); something serious with cancer (r ϭ .80, p Ͻ .001); something urgent with heart attack (r ϭ .71, p Ͻ .001). In terms of activated illness label (not shown), for something transient, the highest label activation was indigestion-higher than either heart attack or cancer (lowest t 199 ϭ 21.22, p Ͻ .001); for something serious, the cancer label had the highest activation (lowest t 199 ϭ 32.61, p Ͻ .001), and for something urgent, the heart attack label had the highest activation (lowest t 199 ϭ 24.25, p Ͻ .001). The network used information in memory to infer a representation profile for the current (unfamiliar) illness and generate hypotheses about identity.
The final observation was activation of the control/cure belief for something transient. The system had been explicitly cued with input information indicating the situation was not controllable, yet the network responded with an internally generated belief that the situation was controllable. In Figure 5 , the situational cue (the input activation) for this is shown as a white downward (negative) arrow and the network's own activated control/cure belief is shown as a rising (positive) column. The latter, network-generated activation differed significantly from zero (t 199 ϭ 26.77, p Ͻ .001) but was in the opposite direction to the situational cue; that is, the system interpreted the situation as controllable despite an explicit cue that it was not controllable. The system's use of existing knowledge (about indigestion) to generate a counterfactual belief is analogous to a person holding an illness belief which runs counter to information presented by the situation. Thus, automatic activation of well-learned information may lead to an illness being erroneously interpreted with implications for inappropriate coping (in the current simulation, ineffectual self-treatment).
Discussion
Simulation 1 showed how illness representations can be accommodated within an associative-learning framework. The network successfully represented known associations between illness labels and illness beliefs (H 1 ), and between illness beliefs and coping, such that activation of the illness label triggered an appropriate coping procedure (H 2 ). Simulation 2 showed how illness representations and coping evolved as symptom interpretations changed over time (H 4 ), highlighting speculative and inappropriate illnessrepresentation beliefs (H 3 ), with implications for the adaptiveness of associated coping procedures.
Four general implications for the CSM (Leventhal et al., 1980) emerged. First, encoding and activation of illness beliefs can occur spontaneously and automatically. The connectionist network autonomously learned consistencies between illness identities, representation beliefs, and coping procedures-knowledge subsequently activated automatically by a stimulus prompt. No executive control was required. This has implications for understanding the way people construe illness representations during their daily lives. Rather than being constructed deliberatively and rationally, they may be reflexive and generated quickly, with few resource requirements. As such, people's initial coping responses may be spontaneous, directed by automatically construed representations (e.g., Fazio, 2001 ) and arise without consideration of alternatives. This automatic construal is consistent with the "ifthen" heuristic proposed by Leventhal as a means by which people identify ways of coping from an illness representation (Leventhal, Leventhal, & Contrada, 1998) . It is unclear the extent to which conventional questionnaires such as the IPQ (Weinman et al., 1996) are sensitive to automatic illness representations because completion requires deliberative introspection. Our evidence emphasizes the need to consider alternative tools for measuring low-level illness representations (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) . For example, Henderson and colleagues used response latency to demonstrate automatic activation of both illness representations and associated coping procedures (Henderson, Hagger, & Orbell, 2007; Henderson, Orbell, & Hagger, 2009) .
The second implication relates to the schematic nature of illness representations-that is, as a coherent set of beliefs. Research has highlighted associations between specific CSM (Leventhal et al., 1984) beliefs with illness outcomes (e.g., Mc Sharry, Moss-Morris, & Kendrick, 2011) . Whereas some analyses treat beliefs as independent (e.g., as predictors in regression), others treat them as sets (e.g., using cluster analysis, or combining items into a single scale; Bean, Cundy, & Petrie, 2007; Clatworthy, Hankins, Buick, WeinFigure 6 . Coping procedures activated for each phase of the illness as it unfolds over time.
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This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. man, & Horne, 2007; Lowe et al., 2011) . Simulation 2 provided support for the latter conceptualization. Information was linked by common association and activated as a schematic set. This occurred even when evidence from the environment contradicted specific individual beliefs within the schema. The potential for self-generated and counterfactual beliefs within illness representations highlights research opportunities for exploring their manifestation and influence on coping. Simulation 2 also highlighted how representation schemas change as an illness unfolds. For example, adding a single piece of central information led to a tipping point that resulted in a quite different representation profile. Specifically, "something serious" was associated with information concerning serious Consequences and low or uncertain Control. The addition of a short Timeline shunted the schema to one representing "something urgent" (second and third representation profiles in Figures 5 ). This also influenced coping, moving the priority from seeing the GP to using emergency services (see Figure 6 ). A tipping-point hypothesis suggests future experiments into the way changing information influences respondents' representations.
The third implication concerns the way connectionist models can enhance theory (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) . First, connectionist modeling requires assumptions to be unequivocal. By contrast, many "box and arrow" models are descriptive and vague about process mechanisms. Here, we explicitly demonstrated process mechanics of automatic illness-belief storage and retrieval. Second, the approach helps generate new hypotheses concerning relationships between construct variables. We conjectured two sets of pairings: illness labels with illness beliefs, and illness beliefs with coping. Illness labels were not directly paired with coping procedures (see Figure 1) ; the network automatically inferred this association in Simulation 1. Finally, constructing the simulation emphasized the subtle and discriminating nature of illness representations. For clarity and parsimony, binary classifications described illness-representation components. Real-world representations would be more nuanced. For example, Timeline (modeled here as unfolding quickly or slowly) may differentiate situations advancing in minutes (choking), hours (giving birth), days (infection), weeks (severe sprains), months (broken bones), and years (chronic conditions). A person could acquire intricate illness knowledge throughout a lifetime, and without attempts to explicitly model these cognitive processes, their subtlety may remain unconsidered or underestimated.
Finally, the CSM differentiates between concrete (bottom-up) representations in which illness symptoms signal an acute problem, and conditions whose symptoms are ambiguous (i.e., silent or chronic; e.g., Horowitz, Rein, & Leventhal, 2004; McAndrew et al., 2008) , in which effective coping requires a knowledge-based (top-down) representation. For example, someone knowing they have asthma may adhere with preventative medication despite the absence of symptoms. Herein, both top-down and bottom-up representations were accommodated within the same processing structure. Simulation 1 involved a top-down representation, in which an illness-knowledge label activated specific beliefs about that illness, along with allied coping representations. Simulation 2 involved a bottom-up process of changing beliefs activated by an ambiguous evolving condition, triggering various candidate illness identities and coping options across time. Further work is needed for in-depth exploration of variability in symptom prototypicality, and how this influences bottom-up construal of (in)appropriate illness representation and coping.
Notwithstanding the above advantages, the current study had limitations. First, as a conceptual exploration, the CSM (Leventhal et al., 1984) was modeled under optimal data conditions. Realworld phenomena are likely noisier and less clear-cut. Our purpose was to test the ability of a general model of associative memory to produce the sorts of behavior predicted by the CSM. As described earlier, examining an information-processing system required knowing in advance associations extant in the data and seeing if the system could detect these relationships. As highlighted by Eiser et al. (2003) "The contribution of . . . connectionist simulations is that we can examine learning . . . in a much purer fashion, that is, unconfounded by any other tendencies that humans might bring to bear on this situation" (p. 1225). Second, we made assumptions about the way information was paired: illness labels with illness beliefs, beliefs with coping procedures (see Figure 1) . These arose from needing to instantiate the CSM within a connectionist model. However, this may also be considered an advantage; it forced a novel prediction about the association of CSM beliefs in memory (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) . Third, the simulation focused on the cognitive representation of illness and omitted or simplified wider aspects of the CSM, including emotional responses, coping representations, and dynamic feedback from coping evaluation. Emotions may activate beliefs affecting the wider cognitive representation and/or impact coping decisions directly. Dynamic feedback from coping may require a recurrent system that aims to predict the utility of specific strategies based on prior experience of the way events string together-generating coping goals or desired outcomes and assessing the extent to which specific coping procedures achieve expected outcomes. Thus, feedback from coping outcomes may influence treatment adherence, lead people to try different strategies, or even undermine (thereby changing) the illness representation because a credible treatment fails to deliver anticipated outcomes (Kucukarslan, 2012) . Although full feedback is not pursued here, Simulation 2 did examine how illness schemas evolve over time in response to changing symptom interpretations. Further complexities of coping representation may also need to be looked at, such as differentiating between action planning (i.e., anticipation of when, where, and how to act) and coping planning (i.e., anticipation of obstacles and how to deal with them) (Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz, & Schüz, 2005) . In sum, addressing complex issues relating to both illness and coping representation provides opportunities for future modeling, perhaps using different network structures or learning rules (e.g., recurrent systems for exploring sequences in decision making or Bayesian networks for modeling representations of cause and effect). Notwithstanding, we view the current work as an initial step along this road, highlighting the schematic nature of illness representation, the potential for a tipping point in representation change, and the generation of counterfactual beliefs. Future work looking at complex associations between illness and coping representation is likely to lead to further conceptual insights and hypotheses.
Finally, one should consider whether connectionist networks are a valid approach for modeling illness beliefs. Our starting point was that beliefs are events in memory which become linked through association, which we examined using a multipurpose, connectionist network applying a generalized delta learning rule. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This rule models mental association through experience, mirroring the Rescorla-Wagner model of reinforcement (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) . Furthermore, connectionist models of memory have advantages over other approaches: They describe process mechanics (no "black boxes"), assumptions are explicit, they model self-organization (no homunculi), and demonstrate "brain-like" characteristics such as parallel processing, fault/noise tolerance, and content addressability (McLeod et al., 1998; O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) . As such, we consider connectionist networks as a useful framework for exploring lowlevel processing of illness representation. A network of the sort used here can be readily modeled in off-the-shelf software (e.g., MATLAB). Although modeling requires familiarization with the concepts and program to run, we hope our work encourages other health psychologists to try their own explorations. Future refinements may include other learning protocols for exploring process complexities such as the influence of feedback on prototype development.
In conclusion, the connectionist network successfully modeled the generation of CSM illness representations. Our analyses suggest that people automatically construe representations, in the moment, from knowledge stored in memory, with well-learned information being highly accessible. Illness representations comprise sets of related beliefs organized as schemas. Their schematic nature may mean situations are wrongly interpreted due to incorporation of inappropriate component beliefs. Common questionnaire approaches are possibly inadequate for detecting automaticity in illness representation; alternative assessment tools may be required. The need for further conceptual exploration of complexities surrounding coping and dynamic feedback is highlighted; the current work has provided a foundation for this.
